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Normativity and Objectivity in  
Historical Writing 
(My Dinner with Schlegel) 
MATT STEILEN† 
Dear friends do not provide the best material for 
reflection. One’s nearness to them interferes in ways that are 
usually undetectable until too late. Peculiar friends, in 
contrast, require a labor of constant reflection. Why on earth 
does he act that way? This Essay is for my dear and peculiar 
friend, Jack Schlegel. It grows out of some readings we did 
together before the pandemic and before the unrest that 
followed the killing of George Floyd, a time that now feels 
like an age ago. The subject was historiography and our 
syllabus included Acton, Beard, Butterfield, Bloch, Carr, a 
packaged introduction to the philosophy of history by R. F. 
Atkinson, and a survey of modern historiography by Georg 
Iggers.1 Collingwood was not assigned, but seemed to loiter 
 
†Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, State University of New York. I 
am grateful to Jack Schlegel for a decade of friendship and mentoring here at 
Buffalo. Thanks to Bert Westbrook for setting up this conference and for inviting 
me to participate. For help with the Essay, thanks to Charles Barzun, Dan 
Farbman, Fred Konefsky, Dan Priel, and Justin Simard. 
 1. See generally LORD ACTON, ESSAYS IN THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF 
HISTORY: SELECTED PAPERS (William H. McNeil ed., 1967); Charles A. Beard, That 
Noble Dream, 41 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1935); HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG 
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (G. Bell & Sons 1963) (1931); MARC BLOCH, THE 
HISTORIAN’S CRAFT (1953); EDWARD HALLETT CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? (1961); R. 
F. ATKINSON, KNOWLEDGE AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
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in the background.2 Admittedly, the choice of readings was 
pedestrian, and it answered no overarching plan or theory 
(the Atkinson I discovered while browsing a used book store), 
but for me the interactions with Schlegel were generative, 
and anyway, setting down the outcome gives me the last 
word. My subject will be objectivity. Rather than unpack 
what Acton and our other sources said about objectivity, my 
focus will be on Schlegel’s efforts to engage with the issue, in 
light of their writings, and with my own efforts to engage 
with Schlegel.  
Let me begin with a sketch of my friend, of his scholarly 
penchants and the particular historical outlook they seem to 
me to embody. This will set up an intellectual problem I want 
to consider. Schlegel’s most basic intellectual impulse is 
contrarian. He works best by combing through a writing and 
tugging on a strand, pulling it loose for all to see. He has a 
heterodox way of describing what he’s found that is baffling 
but often quite compelling, if you have the will to make some 
sense of it. He will begin his comments in the faculty 
workshop with a shaggy-dog story, or some other 
impenetrable remark, but then suddenly use it to explicate 
the discussion’s motifs. Sometimes the comments are sharp, 
even dismissive; sometimes they are humorous or self-
consciously ironic. Apparently, an exasperated member of 
Yale’s faculty once blurted out, “Are you serious, or is this a 
joke?”3 Schlegel is drawn in particular to biographical 
explanations: explanations that connect ideas to friendships, 
annoyances, uncareful remarks, household budgets, and 
professional ambition and alienation. I am thinking of a 
recent essay on Wesley Hohfeld that graciously spares us yet 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (1978); GEORG G. IGGERS, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY TO THE POSTMODERN 
CHALLENGE (1997). 
 2. See generally R. G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY (1st ed. 1946). 
 3. Charles Barzun and I both heard this story and included it in our first 
drafts for this conference. Charles retained the precise language better, and I 
have adopted his version here. As Charles recalled, Schlegel reportedly 
responded, “Both.” 
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another exposition of the “table of fundamental conceptions,” 
exploring instead Hohfeld’s fascinating and rather desperate 
efforts to construct an academic career as a “law professor.”4 
At times, this interest in individuals subsumes everything 
else, so that large-scale, historical forces are miniaturized 
and inscribed on the surface of individual lives. Reviewing a 
monograph he much admired on the legal realists at Yale, 
Schlegel begins by flatly asserting, “Intellectual history is 
the history of intellectuals.”5 What legal realism was, what 
it came to as a theory, depended on who was hanging around 
the school, “so that if the people change, the meaning may 
change also.”6 But these accounts, as interesting as they are, 
have a way of uprooting themselves, because Schlegel tends 
to subject them to the same historicizing and contextualizing 
treatment. After urging in the same review that text requires 
context to be understood and that “texts are not self-
defining,” he adds in an aside, “(nor are contexts for that 
matter)”—and then characteristically lets the matter drop.7 
One comes to the end of a detailed discussion of the 
“intimate” origins of the critical legal studies (CLS) 
movement expecting a conclusion, but Schlegel just shrugs 
his shoulders.8 In this respect, at least, his critical attitude 
is egalitarian. And when he looks around and finds no one at 
the annual conference who will acknowledge the threat of 
regress, he grows “bored,” or maybe frustrated, and he moves 
 
 4. John Henry Schlegel, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld: On the Difficulty of 
Becoming a Law Professor, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD: EDITED MAJOR 
WORKS, SELECT PERSONAL PAPERS, AND ORIGINAL COMMENTARIES (Shyam 
Balganesh et al. eds.) (forthcoming). 
 5. John Henry Schlegel, The Ten Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
435, 435 (1989) [hereinafter Schlegel, Ten Thousand Dollar Question] (reviewing 
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)). 
 6. Id. at 442. 
 7. Id. at 459. 
 8. See John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and 
Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
391, 401 (1984) (“Exactly what should be concluded about the organization and 
its members from all of this is by no means clear.”).  
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on.9 He seeks out people at the periphery who see the 
problem. He finds a distraction. It is possible to avoid studies 
that irritatingly refuse to acknowledge their own political 
and moral commitments, but one ends up having to skip most 
of the conference panels. 
On a recent occasion I found myself playing hooky from 
the annual meeting of legal historians at a pub down the 
street from our hotel, tagging along while Schlegel met with 
a group interested in foundational questions about history. 
A number of different issues came up during the 
conversation, but here I want to pursue one which we might 
frame in the following way. Today we conventionally assume 
that aspects of our identity like class, race, gender, and 
sexual orientation influence how we see and understand the 
world. We capture the particular kind of influence we mean 
by using a metaphor. Identity, we say, forms a kind of 
“perspective,” so that the world presents itself to each 
individual somewhat differently, on analogy to the effect of 
physical position and orientation on visual perception. We 
say, Look, there are things that only someone like me can 
understand! In this way, we attribute our judgments to our 
perspective. When philosophers theorize about these ways of 
speaking, the ideas they use most often are “objectivity” and 
“subjectivity.” Identity is a source of basic empirical concepts 
with which we make sense of the world, and, insofar as these 
concepts are not widely shared, the judgments generated by 
applying the concepts are “subjective.”10 Judgments can also 
be subjective because a concept is indexical, like the 
expressions “here,” “now,” “I,” and the demonstrative “this”: 
 
 9. See John Henry Schlegel, Sez Who? Critical Legal History Without a 
Privileged Position, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL HISTORY 561–62 (Markus 
D. Dubber & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2018) [hereinafter Schlegel, Sez Who?]; 
John Henry Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection, 69 BUFF. L. REV. 
207, 208 (2021) [hereinafter Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection]. 
 10. See generally A.W. MOORE, POINTS OF VIEW (1997); THOMAS NAGEL, THE 
VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986); BERNARD WILLIAMS, DESCARTES: THE PROJECT OF 
PURE ENQUIRY (1978); BARRY STROUD, THE QUEST FOR REALITY: SUBJECTIVISM AND 
THE METAPHYSICS OF COLOUR (2000). 
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whether one speaks a truth when uttering one of these 
expressions will depend on context—on where a person 
physically is when she says, for example, “Here is where I 
found the weapon.” Extending this idea, what it takes to 
speak a truth about, say, whether an experience was 
frightening will depend metaphorically on “where one is,” 
that is, on how things appear from the particular perspective 
of the speaker, in a sense of “perspective” that includes 
aspects of the speaker’s identity, such as race, gender, and 
life experience. That was really frightening, we might say, 
and mean: for a person like me. 
Historians have long wrestled with the question of 
objectivity as well.11 For historians, as well as for 
philosophers, one of the key questions is whether judgments 
about the past can be sufficiently objective, that is, from a 
shared perspective of some kind (even if not universal), 
rather than the perspective of a particular historian. 
Schlegel is interested in this question as well, but in contrast 
to most of the writing on the topic, he has approached the 
issue by distinguishing two notions of truth: (little-t) truth 
and (big-T) Truth. Little-t truth, says Schlegel, is something 
we attribute to a “conclusion[] of thought” to express our 
“evaluation[] of its plausibility.”12 To say a conclusion is 
“true” on Schlegel’s usage is to say we are “secure” in 
thinking it—a description that seems to imply the existence 
of a sound argument for the conclusion, or at least good 
reasons in support. Since Schlegel accepts the conventional 
wisdom that attributes our judgments to our perspective, he 
accepts that different persons grasp different little-t truths, 
although he sometimes expresses this idea by speaking of 
 
 11. See generally PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE “OBJECTIVITY 
QUESTION” AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION (1988). 
 12. John Henry Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, or Reflections on the 
Great Kerfuffle: Historicism’s Continuing Grasp for Truth, 2 n.1 (Aug. 14, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schlegel, If the Music 
Hadn’t Stopped]. 
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different “understandings.”13  
Little-t truths can be truths of perspective, and truths of 
perspective can of course be non-exclusive. In contrast, for 
Schlegel, big-T Truth is the way the world actually and 
determinately is, apart from anyone’s perspective on it. It 
always appears in the singular; since there is one world, 
there is only one way it actually is apart from me or anyone 
else, and there is one True account of it. Something like this 
can be expressed by using a definite article and writing of 
“the Truth.” One of the fundamental intellectual challenges 
to history in the twentieth century has been substantiating 
its relationship to the Truth.14 If a historian’s judgments are 
the product of her perspective (just as any person’s are), then 
how can she tell us the Truth about what happened in the 
past? Which of the competing narratives tells us the Truth, 
and how do we know? 
In recent years, at least, Schlegel has tried to answer 
these kinds of questions by staking out a middle ground. He 
accepts that our judgments about the world are a product of 
our perspective on it. Schlegel takes this as a necessary 
feature of making judgments about the world; there is no 
getting away from one’s perspective, at least in history.15 
This means history cannot tell us about big-T Truth. Its role 
is to enrich our understanding of the world, primarily by 
telling narratives full of the little-t truths that emerge from 
a close study of historical texts. We ought to give up our 
worries about Truth, says Schlegel, and focus on telling 
stories. The public will embrace this role for history: “Better 
narratives, ones admitting their positionality and so their 
 
 13. In a footnote, Schlegel declines to endorse the “possibility of multiple 
‘truths,’” because he doubts speaking that way will have an effect on “academic 
discourse,” which treats truth as singular. Id. at 12 n.25. Whether or not he wants 
to endorse the idea of “multiple truths,” his use of little-t truth does support the 
idea, which Schlegel captures using other terms.  
 14. See IGGERS, supra note 1, at 118–33; ATKINSON, supra note 1, at 69–94; 
NOVICK, supra note 11, at 469–521. 
 15. Schlegel, Sez Who?, supra note 9, at 16. 
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partiality, ones claiming not to unveil a long suppressed 
Truth, but to offer a different understanding of an 
interesting, perhaps even relevant past, might showcase 
what academic historians can do . . . .”16 One senses a core 
value here: that good histories provide us with interesting, 
challenging, richly detailed, and well-researched stories, 
whose telling frees us from the intellectual domination of 
Truth. Legal histories may destabilize efforts to rationalize 
the law, but this is no cause for “resignation”—a label 
proposed by Schlegel’s friend and former colleague, Bob 
Gordon—but for contentedness, and for hope, since 
destabilizing frees us from the intellectual domination of a 
system.17 What of the worries of the CLS movement, whose 
historians aimed to unmask legal systems by revealing the 
Truth—that those systems worked to advance the interests 
of those in power, to the great injury of others? Their 
ambitions, Schlegel thinks, ought to be more modest.18 There 
is no getting at Truth, because there is no way of making 
judgments about the world apart from one’s perspective on 
it. Indeed, Schlegel’s aversion for totalizing accounts—
explanations that appeal to exceptionless rules or laws—
would seem to apply to critical histories as much as to the 
textbook narratives they aim to displace.19 
Here is the intellectual problem I think this sketch leads 
to: On Schlegel’s account of little-t truth, it is difficult to 
make sense of how historical narratives can enrich our 
“understanding” of the past without recourse to a notion like 
 
 16. Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, supra note 12, at 17. 
 17. See Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 
1017, 1036–37 (1981). Gordon writes, “[T]he resigned admit that legal 
institutions, like all human works, are naturally imperfect, are always, because 
of historical contingency, out-of-date, and are inevitably, because of social 
complexity, problematic in their effects; but that’s life.” Id. at 1036. I can imagine 
these exact words coming out of Schlegel’s mouth, accompanied by a shrug and a 
“Sounds fine to me!” 
 18. See Schlegel, Sez Who?, supra note 9, at 15; Schlegel, Ten Thousand 
Dollar Question, supra note 5, at 448–49. 
 19. Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection, supra note 9, at 210. 
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big-T Truth. Schlegel wants to hold on to the idea that 
history can contain errors and that we can identify these 
errors and correct them.20 And he wants to hold on to the 
importance of archival work for producing the kind of 
innovative narratives that enhance our understanding of the 
past. These advancements rest on amassing little-t truths. 
But, of course, not every historical study does correct error 
and enhance understanding; and so those that do must differ 
somehow from those that do not. We surely are able to 
express these differences, to analyze them and say what they 
amount to. Book reviews would be much easier to write if all 
one could say on the topic were, “This book enriches our 
understanding of the origins of the federal Constitution.” But 
something else must be said to justify the judgment. What 
more must be said? Well, Schlegel’s notion of little-t truth 
concerns whether we can be secure in drawing a certain 
conclusion of thought. So what more must be said seems to 
come to this: showing how we can be sure a previous history 
got the past wrong by adducing historical sources to show 
something about the past apart from the writing. To say a 
new history enriches our understanding of the past requires 
showing how we can be secure in accepting its conclusions, 
which would seem again to require adducing historical 
sources that establish this “security” by revealing something 
about the past as it stands outside the writing. In this way, 
our ordinary evaluations of historical studies as being better 
or worse, as being erroneous or (little-t) truthful, as 
enriching our understanding or not, seem to involve recourse 
to the world as it stands apart from our perspective on it, 
that is, to big-T Truth. They press outward to the very notion 
Schlegel wants to avoid. 
There is a second, related intellectual problem waiting 
here as well. Our understanding of the past is not a heap of 
unrelated narratives about different subjects, like the pile of 
magazine back issues one finds at the dentist. Histories 
 
 20. Schlegel, If the Music Hadn’t Stopped, supra note 12, at 15–16.  
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relate to one another in important ways that an account of 
history-writing ought to explain. That relation does not 
consist solely in historians shuffling between various schools; 
there’s more to intellectual history than just a history of 
intellectuals. Academic works of history in particular refer to 
one another, implicitly and explicitly: they are always “in 
conversation” with other histories, addressing interpretive 
questions raised by earlier writings (or dismissing them), 
engaging with prior histories’ selection and interpretation of 
source material, and so on. Historiography is the study of 
history-writing itself, and conventionally we approach it by 
identifying different schools. And although historiography is 
sometimes described as if different schools just followed one 
another arbitrarily (a historiographical version of “one damn 
thing after another”), this is not always the case. Sometimes 
the conversation has a direction to it, and this direction can 
be reconstructed in a way that reflects historians’ 
attachment to certain norms, values, and perceptions, which 
embody a kind of rationality. After all, historians have 
formed schools by systematically criticizing earlier bodies of 
written work, just as book reviews do. A particularly 
damning book review can end a school of thought and launch 
its successor.21 
I think there is a way to preserve the conventional 
attribution of one’s judgments to one’s perspective while 
answering these two problems. Let us assume, with Schlegel, 
that there are at least some elements of our perspective that 
we cannot leave behind or “transcend,” even intellectually.22 
What we need is a way of thinking about the relationship 
between different authors’ perspectives that does not involve 
transcending those perspectives by reference to Truth.23 Put 
 
 21. The paradigmatic example is Noam Chomsky’s review of B.F. Skinner’s 
work, “Verbal Behavior.” See Kenneth MacCorquodale, On Chomsky’s Review of 
Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS BEHAV. 83, 83 (1970). 
 22. For arguments to this end, see Fred D’Agostino, Transcendence and 
Conversation: Two Conceptions of Objectivity, 30 AM. PHIL. Q. 87, 95 (1993). 
 23. See id. at 89–96.  
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another way, what we need is a way of making sense of how 
histories are answerable to the past without supposing a big-
T Truth that serves as a shared standard to correct them. 
Our interest is in what can be called the normativity of 
history: the rightness or wrongness of judgments about the 
past. I suggest that we treat the normativity of history not 
as a function of a relationship between our judgments and 
the past as it was on its own, independent of our perspective 
(the relation Schlegel calls “Truth”), but as the result of 
certain social attitudes within the community of historians. 
To my eye, nothing Schlegel has written is inconsistent with 
this suggestion. Indeed, some things he has said are quite 
close to the account I shall sketch here.24 It should be possible 
for me to persuade Schlegel on this point, then, without 
asking him to give up his basic commitments. So what is 
there to recommend a social account of the possibility of 
normativity in judgments about the past? 
Here is the core intuition. Writing history is a social 
undertaking. It is a form of associating with a community, 
principally the community of historians. When someone 
writes a history, she undertakes a commitment to justify her 
claims about the past, and recognizes that the community of 
historians will hold her responsible. They will form their own 
views as to whether she satisfies this commitment. I’m 
writing of “commitment” here in the singular, but of course 
it’s multifaceted and one could easily use “commitments” 
plural. Think of all the ways in which the success or failure 
of a writing depends on the judgment of the community: what 
 
 24. See, e.g., Schlegel, Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection, supra note 
9, at 213 (arguing that law is “a practice, an activity of humans exercising 
judgment in a time and place when trying both to secure actions deemed by them 
to be beneficial to themselves or detrimental to others,” and that “[l]aw enacts 
the dominant culture”); Schlegel, Ten Thousand Dollar Question, supra note 5, 
at 449 (“Things are because some group of people say they are . . . . 
Understandings of the world change . . . because the individuals who do the 
picturing either find a new understanding more conducive to their work or are in 
the thrall of others who find that new understanding conducive to their interest, 
or both.”). 
2021] MY DINNER WITH SCHLEGEL 143 
it takes to prove a claim about the past; what counts as 
evidence in support of such a claim; how sources of historical 
evidence ought to be identified, interpreted, and related to 
one another; how the archive and its physical contents ought 
to be understood and used; what is the range of permissible 
questions to pose about the past; and what is the range of 
permissible answers to offer to those questions. There is no 
way to write a history without acknowledging the norms that 
relate to these subjects, as well as the authority of the 
community to make a judgment on the matter.25 We could 
also speak of “communities” plural. While these judgments 
belong principally to the community of historians, other 
communities are also involved. Discussing the legal archive, 
Paul Halliday observed that legal “authority . . . is made by 
a community of actors,” whose study requires formulating “a 
collective biography and a set of practices of a community 
whose members created and mastered the archive out of 
which authority was, is, and must continue to be made.”26 It 
wasn’t only judges who invested prior cases with the 
authority of “precedent,” thought Halliday; it was also the 
clerks who created, managed, and used the legal archive. 
And, of course, communities—real human communities—are 
constantly in the process of fracturing and being reshaped, 
sometimes by members themselves, sometimes by outside 
actors or institutions. We will come to this in a moment. For 
now, the core idea, the intuition, comes to this: that we can 
explain how history is made answerable to the past by 
appealing to a human social practice, namely, a practice in 
which the author undertakes to justify her claims to the 
satisfaction of a community whose judgment she recognizes 
 
 25. As Collingwood suggested, history concerns not the past in itself, but how 
the past relates to historians’ thoughts. Collingwood probably meant the 
individual historian, but we can reconstruct his account to refer to the community 
of historians. See CARR, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 26. Paul D. Halliday, Authority in the Archives, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 110, 
112 (2014); see also Ann Laura Stoler, Colonial Archives and the Arts of 
Governance, 2 ARCHIVAL SCI. 87, 87, 90–91, 93 (2002) (describing archives as 
“sites of . . . knowledge production” and “the production of history”). 
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as being authoritative. 
This is an intuition, but it is clearly a trained intuition, 
in my case trained by a long (some would say unfortunate) 
engagement with Hegel scholars during graduate school.27 
Connections could be drawn to the Frankfurt School as well 
(Habermas in particular), or to pragmatism. We can also see 
connections with the body of psychological research 
suggesting that the primary function of human reasoning is 
to produce arguments persuasive to the community.28 But 
perhaps it is artificial to let ourselves be guided by any of 
these theories. What benefits are there to consciously 
adopting an intellectual framework when thinking about 
history? More pointedly, what benefits are there to posing 
stuffy, systematic Hegel as some kind of “friendly 
amendment” to our independent troublemaker, Schlegel? 
I do think it is helpful to be clear about the basic picture 
of normativity underlying this intuition. Normativity is a 
human addition to the world, a result of voluntary human 
actions of undertaking a responsibility and holding another 
person to one. The picture is characteristic of Enlightenment 
thinking, and in this regard, an account of history that 
bottoms here is friendly to Enlightenment social and political 
thought.29 On the other hand, there are clearly diminishing 
 
 27. This is the school of Pinkard, Pippin, and Brandom, who have offered a 
non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy. Pinkard, as I told 
Schlegel, was a teacher of mine. He had come to the Northwestern Philosophy 
Department in part because his friend Pippin had an appointment at the 
University of Chicago. See, e.g., TERRY PINKARD, DOES HISTORY MAKE SENSE? 
HEGEL ON THE HISTORICAL SHAPES OF JUSTICE 39–47 (2017) [hereinafter PINKARD, 
HISTORY]; TERRY PINKARD, HEGEL’S PHENOMENOLOGY: THE SOCIALITY OF REASON 
(1996); ROBERT B. BRANDOM, Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism, in 
TALES OF THE MIGHTY DEAD 210, 216–22 (2002) [hereinafter BRANDOM, 
Pragmatist Themes]; ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT 39–64 (1994). For 
a recent review of Pippin’s work that places his interpretation in the larger body 
of Hegel scholarship, see Charlotte Baumann, Book Review, 27 BRIT. J. FOR HIST. 
PHIL. 1256 (2019) (reviewing ROBERT PIPPIN, HEGEL’S REALM OF SHADOWS (2019)). 
 28. Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for 
an Argumentative Theory, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 57, 60 (2011). 
 29. SEE BRANDOM, Pragmatist Themes, supra note 27, at 218.  
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returns, in this context, from continuing to refine the basic 
picture—certainly to the degree that an academic 
philosopher would ordinarily demand. Nor is my role here to 
attempt such a thing. But if we work from the core intuition 
that history is a kind of social undertaking, we can make 
sense of at least some of what we ordinarily say about writing 
history. We can discover some differences, too. Patterns of 
similarity and difference in the rational reconstruction of our 
ordinary ways of speaking and thinking are surely worth 
noting, if only to achieve a degree of awareness about our 
own practices; so let us see very briefly where the thought 
takes us. 
First, we can preserve the conventional attribution of an 
individual’s judgments to her perspective, mentioned above, 
as long as it is possible to reconstruct perspective as 
membership in a set of overlapping communities. On this 
approach, seeing the world from a particular point of view 
entails undertaking commitments to which we are held 
responsible by members of the various communities whose 
authority on those subjects we recognize. We tend to credit 
the judgments of humans in those communities because of 
what we share with them. To see the world like us is to be a 
member in a community with us, composed of individuals 
similar in some salient way. This allows us to think about 
perspective without being drawn into distinguishing little-t 
and big-T versions of truth. This is probably a good thing. All 
things being equal, we should prefer to say that there is one 
sense of “true,” and to define the expression in its ordinary 
sense, as the property of being in accordance with reality; we 
can then employ a social account of normativity to explain 
how attributions of such a property function in the context of 
history-writing. Large-scale, global claims about the cause of 
a major event are commitments of the same sort as smaller, 
granular historical judgments, but the former are much 
harder to discharge to the satisfaction of the community of 
historians (potentially impossible). For similar reasons, we 
should want to say that we know things about history, in an 
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ordinary sense of “knowledge” that implies truth. This is 
especially important to professional history, and not simply 
to secure the department’s university budget. Denialism and 
fabrication about the past are popular political tools today, 
and professional history has an important role to play in 
checking those practices. It can do this only if historians 
speak sensibly about what we know about the past. Whether 
we do know what we say we know about the past is settled, 
of course, by the present attitudes of the larger community 
of historians, applying the prevailing norms of the historical 
method. Let me be clear that no particular philosophical 
theory of truth is on offer here, although the approach is 
friendly to “deflationist” and “internal” theories rather than 
classical, metaphysically robust accounts. Rather, what is on 
offer here is the core of a theory of how our claims to know 
things about the past, as a result of historical research, 
actually do answer to the past—of how a certain kind of 
normativity is possible. 
Understanding history as a social practice also allows us 
to make sense of how history-writing changes. This was one 
of the intellectual problems we considered above. It, too, has 
a political aspect; it is not uncommon today to encounter 
pundits or even public intellectuals pointing to paradigm 
shifts as evidence that history does not answer to the past at 
all, but merely to intellectual fads or the moral anxieties of 
the present. Schlegel’s historical outlook, it must be said, 
does little to combat this reaction. A history that cannot 
contribute to the search for Truth, whose primary 
contribution to our intellectual life is to supply new, 
arresting stories, savors too much of the aesthetic and too 
little of the epistemic. Schlegel can certainly explain how 
new stories trigger changes in historians’ interests, but he 
cannot explain the rationality of those changes—how change 
responds to deficiencies in earlier accounts other than simple 
incompleteness. 
There is a significant variation within the community of 
historians in attitudes about proper historical subjects and 
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methods, even at a single point in time. We should be able to 
explain at least some of these differences by appeal to 
something other than differences in taste or “perspective.” In 
the late 1990s, the editor of the Journal of American History, 
David Thelen, engaged in a fascinating “experiment”: he 
published an unedited submission by an eminent historian 
on the subject of lynching, along with five signed referee 
reports evaluating the piece’s suitability for publication in 
the journal.30 At the outset, Thelen noted that readers of 
JAH had repeatedly expressed interest in better 
understanding “how and why we practice” history. The 
submission, written by Joel Williamson, was well-suited to 
the subject. It was highly biographical: it explored the 
development of Williamson’s own historical understanding, 
as he moved from a childhood view of lynching as an episode 
in frontier justice to the realization, after a lengthy study of 
manuscript sources, that it was “an established institution 
in a whole and ongoing cultural complex shared by several 
million white southerners,” as those men and women 
attempted to solidify their political and social standing 
relative to freed blacks.31 Thelen thought the account pushed 
historians to “think about what we see and do not see, to 
reflect on what in our experience we avoid, erase, or deny, as 
well as what we focus on.”32 The referee reports cleaved along 
race lines. David Blight, a white professor of history and 
black studies then at Amherst College, thought the piece 
important because it showed “how American historians 
didn’t or couldn’t see lynching in their developing visions of 
the past.”33 But Robin D. G. Kelley, a black historian then at 
NYU, thought the piece “sets us back a decade” by its casual 
and unexamined use of the word “we” in describing the 
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evolution of American historians, while at the same time 
overlooking the mass of early writing by African American 
and Jewish historians on lynching in the south. It was 
entrenching the exclusion of black historians on a subject 
that remained a live memory in some black communities.34 
The volume puts the entire process of creating 
normativity in historical writing on view. Here we have a 
leading historian reporting that his own judgment about 
what counted as a profitable subject of historical study 
reflected a set of attitudes nurtured by his early experiences 
and education; that the understanding of lynching had been 
erased in white communities in the wake of political 
transformations in the south after 1915, some ten years 
before the author’s birth; and that he had as a result largely 
dismissed lynching and embraced segregation as the most 
pressing question of southern social and political 
development after the Civil War.35 The Civil Rights 
movement further encouraged his study of segregation. It 
was only by accident, in the course of this study, that he came 
upon individual manuscript sources that he could not fit 
within the conceptual structure of southern history he had 
erected. The discovery was so powerful that, instead of 
dismissing the documents as outliers, Williamson rejected 
his entire framework and subject, and it was then that 
Williamson began to see how southern whites had 
constructed a racial ideology to justify their political use of 
lynching and torture against blacks.36 Williamson’s 
understanding of lynching had been moved by a realization 
that he could not make good on his earlier commitments, and 
in this respect a number of influential historians of the south 
followed him. 
Not all historians developed along the same path; not 
everyone shared the same attitudes and the same 
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understanding of what constituted an appropriate 
framework for studying the place of lynching in southern 
politics and society. The referees who advised rejecting the 
piece described a different set of intellectual influences. 
Those influences produced a historical sensibility in which 
lynching had a very different social and political meaning, 
and judged against these standards, Williamson’s 
admissions were embarrassing, retrogressive, exclusionary, 
and “conceptually wrongheaded.”37 The simultaneous 
publication of the referee reports placed these judgments in 
conversation with one another, revealing the rational shape 
of the struggle between them about the place of lynching in 
American history and historiography. 
I don’t think we should explain this encounter simply by 
saying that Williamson and his interlocutors had different 
“perspectives” on lynching. Nor should we say that they were 
grasping different (little-t) “truths” or expressing different 
“understandings.” The encounter showed more than mere 
difference. We should say, I think, that what the JAH 
experiment revealed was an ongoing shift in prevailing views 
of lynching in southern history, triggered by a change in 
historians themselves and in the community of historians. 
The change was not simply a change in personnel, a matter 
of old men retiring and being replaced by new men and 
women. Nor was the change definitional; there was no set of 
historical “givens”—no definitions or basic empirical 
concepts constitutive of doing “southern history”—that 
researchers simply abandoned.38 Rather, particular sources 
and works of history exposed how the community’s dominant 
attitudes about the proper subjects and methods of history 
were unsatisfactory. What we saw, in short, was what 
Hegelians have called a breakdown in the prevailing “order 
of thought,” triggered by a failure to justify the response to 
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an emerging body of historical evidence.39 This is at once a 
process of determining what counts as a good work of written 
history and who is a historian. What might be called the 
political and social history of the discipline emerges as a 
complement to historiography itself, as a means of 
explaining the sense of the change in disciplinary norms.  
One last point. The principal difference with ordinary 
ways of speaking about history that emerges from this 
framework concerns the place of moral evaluations in 
historical writing. Professional historians commonly speak of 
the importance of understanding the past on its own terms.40 
On some occasions, this is meant as nothing more than an 
endorsement of the importance of immersing oneself in the 
archive and generating the sort of intuitive understanding 
that this labor generates. On other occasions, however, 
something stronger is meant: Butterfield, for example, 
seemed to think the historian could by imagination 
understand a past world in which an actor had moved or an 
event taken place. The historical imagination is spoken of 
like a kind of mental faculty that allows the historian to 
access the past as it is apart from the historian’s present-day 
perspective.41 Since moral judgments impose values and 
concepts from the present day on past actors, they do not 
grasp the past on its own terms. The most we can say about 
actors in the past, wrote Butterfield, is that they were 
“mak[ing] the best of it.”42 Yet it seems fanciful to pretend 
that contemporary histories written by professional 
historians do not contain moral judgments. Indeed, many 
excellent works of history have a strong moral core—a 
commitment to a set of moral values that do not derive from 
historical sources—and part of what makes these writings 
vigorous and rich is this morality. Emphasizing the 
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importance of archival work cannot tilt into uncritical 
acceptance of what one finds in a written document.43 
Getting too close to the perspective of a past actor deprives 
us of something that counts as understanding of his 
conduct.44 If what counts as good and bad history depends on 
the attitudes of the community of historians, we should 
anticipate this kind of moral skepticism about the past. 
Historians, like anyone else, hold moral and political views 
about the present and the past, and it would be odd to expect 
those views to exercise no influence on their attitudes about 
historical writings that touch on the same subject.45 That 
normativity in history has its source in the attitudes of 
modern-day historians is the kernel of truth in presentism. 
And while those attitudes concern judgments about the past, 
they naturally draw on moral judgments about related 
matters in the present. 
* * * 
If what makes history answerable to the past is the 
attitudes of historians, then I owe a great deal to Jack 
Schlegel. For as our law school unraveled in the past few 
years, and most of its historians left, Schlegel stayed. And as 
difficult as he sometimes was—he was sometimes 
unreasonably difficult, I thought—he insisted on being my 
community. There I was, wandering blindly, nearly alone, 
fumbling with texts I could barely read, and he came by and 
prodded. The whole thing was modest. We were, in his words, 
“reasonably decent historians of the second or third order,” 
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but for including me in this distinction, I cannot thank him 
enough: for it implied that I was writing history. 
